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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY DUGGER, dba J & D 
ENTERPRISES, 
Respondent - Plaintiff, 
vs, 
PAUL J. COX, COX CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY TREASURER, JOSEPH A. 
MOLLERUP, IlcGHIE LAND TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
CLIVE M. *1AXWELL, dba C. M. 
MAXWELL ELECTRIC COMPANY, and 
HERB TOWERS MURRAY PLUMBING 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
ADne Hants Defendants, 
Case No. 14395 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and Respondent, Jerry Dugger, dba J. & D. 
Enterprises, (hereafter called "Dugger"), filed a mechanic's 
lien in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, State of 
Utah, on July 19, 1972 against a parcel of property owned 
by Cox Corporation, a Utah Corporation located at 1342-3146 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, (hereinafter 
called "State Street Property"), for work done by Dugger 
upon the property from between January 1, 1972 and June 30, 
1972. The lien amount was $33,4 07.93. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On September 19, 1972 Hugger filed suit in lower court 
against Paul J. Cox individually, and also against Cox & 
Corporation, (both hereinafter designated as "Cox"), to 
foreclose his lien. The other defendants herein named 
were also brought into the lawsuit for the purpose of 
having the court determine their various interests in and 
to the State Street Property. 
Dugger claimed that his lien included the amounts 
claimed in other liens filed by two subcontractors, Clive 
M. Maxwell, dba C. M. Maxwell Electric, in the amount 
of $3,042.00, and Herb Towers Murray Plumbing, Inc. in 
the amount of $3,172.23. 
Not only was Dugger seeking to have wages which he 
claimed were due him from Cox for supervising th€* State 
Street Property improvements included as part of the lien 
amount, but he was alternatively seeking a personal money 
judgment against Cox for the value of said wages alleged due. 
Defendants Cox filed a Counterclaim against Dugger 
wherein Cox alleged he was damaged in the sum of $50,000.00 
by reason of Duggerfs unjustly and unlawfully encumbering 
the State Street Property with an invalid lien. The essence 
of the testimony elicited from Cox to substantiate this claim 
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for damages was that the Johnsons, who has a lease on the 
State Street Property under the name of "Dynatek", had failed 
to pay their rent, and as a result, Cox's friend, Joseph A. 
Mollerup, refused to extend loans to Cox to improve this 
and other properties which Cox allegedly owned. Cox claimed 
that Dugger compounded the problem of obtaining the improvement 
loans from Mollerup by filing an invalid lien. When Cox was 
unable to improve his properties, he claimed he suffered loss 
of rents on all of his properties in the sum of $50,009.00. 
The sum of $150,000.00 was claimed for punitive damages by 
Cox; however no testimony was obtained from Cox or anyone else 
which would support a claim for malicious intent on the part 
of Dugger in the filing of his lien on the State Street 
Property. 
A separate suit was consolidated with this action 
bearing Civil No. 215,255, wherein Service Station Supply, 
(hereinafter called "Station"), claimed moneys due from 
Cox and Dugger in the sum of $678.98 for providing materials 
and labor on the State Street Property; however Sation did 
not file a lien against the State Street Property. Dugger 
claimed his lien included the Station claim. 
Prior to trial in the lower court, all parties stipulated 
that the first mortgage on the State Street Property held 
by Mollerup, assigned to Beesley, then to Zions First National 
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Bank, and the tax lien held by Salt Lake County, were superior 
to any held by any of the other lien claimants. The parties 
stipulated that Sions First National Bank, the assignee of 
Mollerup, had a valid and existing first mortgage on the 
State Street Property in the amount of $4 0,000.00, and that 
Salt Lake County had a valid and subsisting tax lien for 
the tax years 1970 and 1971 on the State Street Property 
in the amount of $2,537.33. These two parties were then 
dismissed from the case. 
It was further stipulated by and between the remaining 
parties that the mechanic's liens filed by Dugger, Maxwell and 
Towers were valid and proper in all respects. Cox's counsel, 
however, reserved the right to challenge the liens on the 
question of whether or not they attached as against Cox's 
interest in the State Street Property. (P. 8, lines 24-30, 
P. 9, lines 1-30, P. 10, lines 1-4). 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The Court entered a judgment foreclosing the mechanic's 
liens filed by Dugger, Maxwell and Towers against any right, 
title or interest Cox had in and to the State Street Property. 
Dugger was awarded judgment against Cox in the sum of $25,6 35. 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum 
from July 19, 1972 to the date of judgment, and for attorney 
fees in the sum of $3,000.00, and this judgment became a lien 
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on the State Street Property, and said property was ordered sold 
to satisfy said lien. Likewise, Maxwell was awarded judgment 
against Cox in the sum of $2,342.00, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from May 10, 1972 to 
the date of judgment. Towers was awarded judgment on its 
lien in the sum of $3,172.23 together with interest thereon 
at the rate of 6% per annum from Juen 8, 1972 to the date 
of judgment, and attorney fees in the sum of $800.00. All 
liens were ordered foreclosed, and the State Street Property 
sold at sheriff's sale to satisfy said liens. 
The court further awarded a personal money judgment 
against Cox and Dugger and in favor of Station for the sum 
of $678.98. 
Judgment was entered November 10, 1975, effective 
November 24, 1975, and the State Street Property was sold 
at sheriff's sale December 30, 1975 for the sum of $6,500.00. 
Dugger then received a deficiency judgment on his judgment 
against Cox on January 6, 1976 in the sum of $27,911.28. 
The State Street Property was subsequently redeemed by 
Cox and a certificate of redemption was issued August 2, 
1976. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dugger met Cox in early December of 1971 when Dugger 
-5-
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upon passing the State Street Property happened to see a 
"For Rent" sign. He inquired of Cox concerning the possibility 
of leasing the property. Cox told Dugger that the property 
had already been rented, but that he had some properties 
in both Richfield and in Nephi which he might be willing to 
lease to Dugger. A few days later Cox and Dugger traveled 
to Nephi and Richfield to inspect the properties, and they 
discussed drawing up a lease on them, though no lease was 
actually signed on those properties until May of 1972. 
It was also at that time that Cox and Dugger discussed the 
forming of a business relationship in view of the apparent 
benefits each could afford the other. 
On or about December 13, 1971 Cox brought Dugger to the 
law office of Gerald Turner, the attorney who had represented 
Curtis Johnson and Dynatek with regard to its lease on the 
State Street Property. During the course of the conversation 
Cox stated in front of Gerald Turner that Dugger was Cox's 
contractor, and that he was doing all of Cox's building for 
him. (P. 148, lines 23-26). 
Thereafter in January, 1972 Dugger negotiated the move 
of a house from the State Stree Property at Cox's direction. 
Dugger also began to hire labor and to order materials to 
imporve the State Street Property. (P. 169, lines 13-23), 
(P. 174, lines 11-16). 
-6-
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In March,1972 Dugger requested Cox to pay him for his 
supervisory services. Cox ignored this request. At various 
times, however, Cox would pay Dugger for services performed 
and for labor provided under Duggerfs supervision on the 
State Street Property; however, when it became apparent 
to Dugger that Cox was not going to pay him for the vast 
majority of labor and material he had ordered on the job, 
Dugger filed his lien. Dugger included within his lien 
not only sums which he had personally paid out for materials 
and labor, but also claims made upon him by subcontractors, 
including Maxwell and Towers, and Service Station Supply, 
and claims made by his materialmen such as Amcor and Yeates, 
and a claim for his supervisory services computed at $1,009.00 
per month for the period of time he was working on the job site. 
Dugger claimed that he had entered into an oral contract 
with Cox wherein Dugger agreed to supply the labor and materials 
to improve the State Street Property. Dugger claimed Cox 
agreed to pay Dugger the sum of $1,000.00 per month for his 
supervisory services on the project. (P. 169, lines 18-23). 
Dugger claimed that he did not disclose to suppliers 
and materialmen that he was working for Cox or that Cox 
was the owner of the property because Cox's credit rating 
was very poor, and suppliers and materialmen would refuse 
-7-
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to supply materials or provide labor if they knew Cox was 
the owner. (P. 296, lines 7-15), (P. 216, lines 28-29), 
(P. 222, lines 12-29). 
Curtis Johnson, President of Dynatek Corporation, and 
lessee of the State Street property, testified that he never 
hired Dugger at any time to do any work on the State Street 
Property, He further testified that he had heard Cox say 
many times over a period of several months in 1972 that Dugger 
was doing work for Cox- Johnson stated that Cox and Dugger 
seemed to be inseparable during the first months of 1972. 
(P. 128, lines 9-26), (P. 129, lines 15-22), (P. 131, lines 
7-21), (P. 132, lines 14-19). 
Johnson further testified that he had agreed on behalf of 
Dynatek to pay Cox an extra percentage of the rents if Cox 
would improve the property. (P. 134, lines 17-25). 
Woolas Macey testified that he was an installer of car 
wash systems for CPI Systems, and that he contacted Cox in 
an attempt to interest him in installing a car wash system 
on the State Street Property in late 1971> (P. 156, lines 
3-15). He stated that sometime during the early part of 
1972 he heard Cox say to him that Dugger was his contractor 
for the State Street Property improvements. (P. 160, lines 
8-24), (P. 161, lines 12-16). He further stated that 
in the times he met with Cox that Dugger was usually with him. 
-8-
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Dugger testified that he ordered the materials, and 
requested the labor to be performed in improving the State 
Street Property, and that he did so at the instance and 
request of Cox. (P. 169, lines 18-23). 
Cox stated in his deposition, and affirmed the same 
under oath at trial that he had co-negotiated several jobs 
with Dugger, including the State Street Property job. 
(P. 255, lines 21-30). 
Of course Cox later claimed that he never at any time 
had hired Dugger to do the improvements on the State Street 
Property. (P. 26 3, lines 1-2). He also termed the testimony 
of Macey, Turner and Johnson as false, and called Turner 
and Johnson liars. (P. 265, lines 19-22). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT 
DUGGER WAS AGENT FOR COX AND WAS ENTITLED TO PLACE A LIEN 
ON THE STATE STREET PROPERTY. 
A mechanic's lien may be broadly defined as a charge 
imposed upon real property in favor of one who furnishes labor 
or provides materials for the improvement of property. 
10 Thompson, Real Property, § 5186, at 265 (repl. 1957). 
It is designed to give the security of a lien for the value 
-9-
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of work done or materials furnished. Under Utah's legislative 
scheme, a claimant must tneet two requirements before he is 
entitled to the salutary effects of a mechanic's lien. First, 
he must show a valid contract, express or implied, with the 
owner. Second, he must show that he either furnished labor 
or supplied material, or both, resulting in the construction 
of an improvement upon the real property involved; Utah 
Code Ann., §38-1-3 (Repl. vol. 1966) The person who supplies 
materials or performs labor is entitled to the value of the 
improvements on real property if the person did so at the 
instance of the owner or any other person acting by the owner's 
authority, as agent, contractor, or otherwise. Ibid. Thus, 
not only could Dugger, but also Maxwell and Towers could 
seek to foreclose their lien if the improvements were made 
at the instance of Cox. So long as Cox and Dugger had an 
agreement of some sort regarding Dugger's improving the 
subject property for Cox, it will support a lien in favor 
of all other persons who have, either under express or implied 
contract with Dugger, rendered services, performed labor, or 
furnished materials. Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 
24 Utah 130, 66 Pac. 779 (1901). 
It thus becomes immaterial whether or not Dugger was 
the agent of Cox or whether he was an independent contractor 
who entered into a contract with Cox for the improvement of 
-10-
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the State Street Property. All lien claimants' liens are valid 
if the improvements were requested of Dugger at the instance 
of Cox. Ample testimony exists in the record to support 
this conclusion reached by the trial court. It has been 
referred to above. Of course, there is conflicting testimony 
on the question of whether or not Cox requested Dugger to 
improve the State Street Property, but the lower court found 
as a factual matter that Cox did request Dugger to imrove 
the property. In malting that determination, the lower court 
took into balance the testimony of the witnesses, their 
deportment and demeanor, and other evidence. 
The weight and sufficiency of the evidence cannot 
ordinarily be reviewed. Sandall vs. Sandall, 5 7 Utah 15 0, 
193 P. 1093, 15 ALR 620. The trial court's decision on 
questions of fact are conclusive upon the Supreme Court, 
and the only matters proper for review here are errors 
made by the lower court on questions of law. 5 Am Jur 2nd 
Appeal and Error, §820, page 261. It is thus clear that 
where evidence exists to support the lower court's finding 
that the Dugger, Maxwell and Towers liens were valid 
as against Cox, that such factual determination cannot be re-
examined upon appeal. 
-11-
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED PROPERLY WHEN IT GRANTED A PERSONAL 
JUDGMENT AGAINST COX AND IN FAVOR OF DUGGER 
At the close of his case, Dugger moved to amend his 
complaint to conform with the evidence presented, and to 
include the claim of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. 
(P. 224, lines 1-10). The trial court took the motion 
under advisement, and in its memorandum decision granted 
judgment to Dugger. 
There is testimony that Cox did specifically ask 
Dagger to provide materials and labor to improve the 
State Street Property and that Dugger was not acting 
officiously. (P. 169, lines 18-23). The contract need 
not be express, but may be implied from the actions of 
the parties. A contract may be implied between the 
parties where the owner receives benefits from the improvements 
to the property. Where the owner tacitly assents to 
the imrovements by permitting them to be made, a contract 
may be implied by the court. Bugger's Complaint alleges 
that Dugger and Cox entered into an agreement whereby the 
Respondent would aid the Appellant in making certain 
improvements to the State Street Property. (See paragraph 
Three). Morrison, Merrill & Co. v. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 
59 Pac. 235 (1399). 
-12-
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Since judgment was granted to Dugger under the 
lien foreclosure claim, it is safe to assume that the 
court found a contract existing between Dugger and Cox, 
or the court implied such a contract. Whether the court 
found in favor of Dugger on the theory of unjust enrichment 
is impossible to determine from the record. It is clear, 
however, that the court did find in favor of Dugger and 
against Cox on the lien foreclosure claim, and awarded 
Dugger a personal judgment against Cox presumably on the 
theory of breach of contract. The question of whether 
or not both the personal judgment and the lien foreclosure 
judgment may exist at the same time will be handled 
at a later point in this brief. 
It is clear, however, that the lower court could 
properly have awarded a personal judgment against Cox 
based upon the pleadings, the motion to amend the pleadings 
to conform with the evidence at the end of Respondent's 
case in chief, and the evidence elicited from the witnesses. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOTERR WHEN IT DECLARED DUGGERfS LIEN 
VALID, SINCE IT DETERMINED THAT THE SUMS DUE UNDER THE 
CLAIM FELL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE LIEN• 
As has already been pointed up, the parties, prior to 
trial, stipulated that the liens were valid in all respects, 
-13-
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with the exception that Cox reserved the right to challenge 
whether or not the liens applied to his. interests in the 
property. (P. 8, lines 24-30), (P. 9, lines 1-30), (P. 10, 
lines 1-4). 
The Respondent put on testimony with regard to items 
it claimed were covered within the lien claim of $33,407.93. 
The respondent, in the alternative, claimed that if the 
Court found any items were not found within the lien, that 
he should be granted a personal money judgment. One specific 
item was the $7,000.00 the Respondent claimed was due him 
from Cox for his supervisory services. Respondent alleged 
there may have been other items to have been included within 
the lien claim in his complaint, but Respondent did not 
present testimony as to any additional items, nor did 
Respondent amend his complaint as to any additional items. 
The Appellant now argues that inasmuch as Respondent alleged 
there may have been additional items to be included within 
the lien, but not amended thereto, the original lien is 
somehow invalid. Such an argument is not even logical. 
Respondent was not required to amend his lien for any 
additional items he may have claimed fell within the lien. 
Respondent did not present any testimony regarding any 
additional items other than those originally claimed within 
the lien. Respondent did not amend his lien as to any 
-14-
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additional items. Respondent was not bound as a matter of law 
to do so in order to prevail against the Appellant. 
Appellant missates the pleadings when he asserts Respondent's 
Complaint states on its face that the lien covered property 
in excess of that which was intended. The complaint does allege 
that there "has been some other items completed by the Plaintiff 
herein in addition to those filed in the lien against the 
premises as heretofore described." These items could have 
been amended into the lien, but were not, and no evidence was 
ever taken as to those items. 
-15-
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POINT IV 
THE LIENS OF OTHER JUDGMENT CREDITORS ARE VALID AND THE LOWER 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THEY WERE FILED PURSUANT TO LAW 
As has been pointed out above, the parties stipulated 
prior to trial that the liens of Dugger, Maxwell and Towers 
were proper in all respects and had been validly and timely 
filed, and they were thus admitted into evidence by the 
court. (P. 8, lines 15-30), (P. 9, lines 1-25K (P. 10, 
lines 2-4). The only reservations made by Cox's counsel 
were whether or not;the liens would attach to Cox's interest 
in the State Street Property. Cox's counsel also reserved 
the right to dispute whether or not Cox and Dugger had 
entered into an oral contract. Thus by his stipulation, 
Cox is estopped to deny that said liens were valid. 
The court found as a matter of fact that Dugger did 
improve the State Street Property at the instance and 
request of Cox, and that Dugger had hired Maxwell and Towers 
as subcontractors. 
As to the Tower's lien, the lien on its face shows 
that it was filed against Cox Corporation pursuant to 
a request with Dynatek. Curtis Johnson of Dynatek testified 
that he had an agreement with Cox that Cox would pay for 
additional work, (P. 134, lines 17-25), including plumbing. 
There was thus sufficient testimony for the lower court to 
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have found that Towers did work at the instance of Cox 
through Johnson, i\s discussed above, the lien would then 
be valid against Cox's interest in the State Street Property. 
As to the Maxwell lien, there is testimony from Dugger 
that he requested Maxwell to furnish materials and labor at 
Cox's instance and request. (P 186, lines 3-11). Since 
Maxwell was Dugger's subcontractor, the lien does not fail, 
since Maxwell's work was done at the instance and request 
of Cox's agent, contractor or other person acting for Cox. 
As to Maxwell's listing of Dynatek as well as Dugger 
as the person with whom the contract was made to supply the 
materials and labor, it is clear that Cox agreed to have 
Johnson supply labor and materials for which Cox would be 
responsible. The same argument applies to Maxwell as it 
does to Towers in this regard. 
The liens of Towers and Maxwell must be sustained since 
the trier of fact found the labor and material was performed 
at the instance and request of Cox either through Dugger or 
through Johnson, and the testimony supports this finding. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO 
DUGGER AND TOWERS 
Section 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated specifically 
provides: 
"In any action brought to enforce 
any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorney's 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which 
shall be taxed as costs in the action." 
(Emphasis mine.) 
On the Dugger claim for attorney fees, Dugger testified 
that he had been required to obtain the services of an attorney 
to foreclose his lien, and that $3,000.00 was a reasonable sum 
for his counsel!s services. (P. 192, lines 8-14). 
On the Towers claim for attorney fees, McGregor, Tower's 
agent, testified that Towers had contracted to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee in the matter, and that $800.00 
was a reasonable fee. (P. 37, lines24-28). 
For the court to determine whether attorney fess are 
reasonable the use of expert witnesses is not reqired. 
Wildes v. Dappinian, 87 RI 131, 138 A. 2nd 823. An attorney 
who performed the services, or another expert on attorney fees, 
or another witness, or even the plaintiff himself may testify 
regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees and the amount 
thereof. 7 Am Jur 2nd, Attorneys at Law, §2 68, page 197. 
The court is not required to look solely to the testimony 
-18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees; it may take 
into consideration the pleadings and other filings in the 
case, the time spent by the attorneys at trial, attending 
circumstances, and its own knowledge and experience regarding 
the character of such services in awarding attorney fees. 
7 Am Jur 2nd, Attorneys at Law, §269, page 197. 
Even if no testimony were taken regarding attorney fees, 
or the reasonableness thereof, the court is required to 
determine and tax as costs the attorney fees to be awarded 
the successful party under the statute cited above. 
There is no question under Utah law that the foreclosure 
of a mechanicfs lien under Section 33-1-18, Utah Code 
Annotated is an equitable proceeding. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that it is the perogative of the trial judge 
to determine disputed questions of fact in equity matters, 
and that the trier of fact's duty with respect to determining 
attorney fees or other factual matters is only advisory 
to the court's determination thereof. Frehner v. Morton, 
18 U 2nd 422, 424 P 2nd 446. Hence, in the instant case 
the court was not required to take testimony regarding 
attorney fees, and if it did so, such testimony was only 
advisory to the court's discretion in the determination 
of attorney fees to be awarded the successful party. 
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POINT VI 
', DUGGER1 S .LIEN WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND THE COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN DECLARING THE LIEN VALID 
Dugger1s lien was filed July 19, 1972 for the sum 
of $33,407.93. Pursuant to the testimony, and the appendix 
annexed hereto, the lien was not excessive. The fact that 
the court chose not to award the entire amount claimed due 
under the lien does not make the lien any less valid. 
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 U 2nd 422, 424 P 2nd 446. (1966) 
Counsel for Cox in his argument before the court 
brashly states, without any supporting evidence whatever 
in the record, that Dugger without cause or justification 
liened other properties of the Cox Corporation, which 
shows that Dugger was attempting to procure an advantage 
or benefit, prohibited by statute. There were no pleadings, 
no evidence, and no reason whatever to make such an extraneous 
argument. Such an argument does not even belong in this 
appeal, and there is not even a record upon which Respondent 
can respond. 
In fact Dugger was successful in asserting his lien 
claim against Cox in the present action. If Dugger were 
successful, then he could not be found to be taking advantage 
of the Appellant by reason of asserting a fallacious lien. 
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POINT VII 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DUGGER CO-MINGLED NONLIENABLE ITEMS 
IN HIS LIEN CLAIM 
Inasmuch as the court found that Dugger had supplied 
material and labor, or caused them to be supplied to the 
State Street Property at the instance and request of Cox, 
Dugger cannot be deemed to have been a mere volunteer with 
regard thereto. 
The Appellant raises the issue of whether or not 
Dugger could assert a lien for labor and materials supplied 
by subcontractors or materialmen. The cases hold that one 
in Duggerfs position may file a lien in behalf of his 
subcontractors and materialmen especially where Dugger is 
personally liable for the debt. 
In §91, C.J.S., Mechanic's Liens, page 604, we find: 
"It is generally held that a contractor is 
entitled to a lien for labor furnished by him 
and actually performed by persons working 
under him; even though his workmen have taken 
out liens, the effect is only to diminish that 
lien oro tanto.u (See Idaho Riggen v. Perkins, 
246 P~ 62, 42 Ida 391). 
In
 Parker V. Tilghman v.Morgan Inc., 133 A 224, 170 Md 7, 
and in Rice v. Baxter, 15 Pa. 198, 40 C.J. 140, note 14, 
the court held that a subcontractor could file a lien even though 
the contractor had previously filed a lien on the entire contract. 
By inverse reasoning, Dugger had a right to file a lien On the 
entire amount due even though other creditors subsequently filed 
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liens for the amounts due to them. The effect would be to 
reduce Dugger's lien pro tanto, Isbell v. Payne, 147 P 2nd 
718, 158 Kan 298. 
In Re Lightner (DC Cal), 184 P Supp 825, the court stated: 
"We can see no reason for allowing a corporation 
to claim a lien for the labor of its servants, and 
denying the right to an independent contractor 
who does the work through those servants. Holding 
as we do on this point, it becomes immaterial 
whether this claimant was or was not an independent 
contractor." 
All of the testimony taken was with regard to items 
which Dugger claimed were part of the lien. The court chose 
to disallow the claim for Dugger!s services for $1,000.00 
per month. Dugger argued that those services for superintending 
were properly includable within the lien. In C.J.S., 
Mechanic's Liens, §37, we find: "In many jurisdictions a 
mechanic's lien may be acquired for services in superintending 
construction of a building or improvement." And in the 
absence of a special contract fixing the value of the 
services, a reasonable value is to be placed thereon by the 
trier of fact. Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 U 
130, 66 P. 779. 
Dugger testified that all of the items referred to 
in the appendix were used in connection with the State 
Street property. Except for some items shipped by Amcor 
to Ogden and Richfield, all expenses incurred were for 
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labor and materials or for procuring labor and materials 
to improve the structures on the South State Street Property. 
These were never challenged by the Appellant. There is 
no evidence whatever in the record that any items whatever 
were purchased for resale, and which were shipped to Dynatek 
and sold by Dynatek. 
Dugger claimed that he went to California for the 
purpose of obtaining materials to be used in the State 
Street Property improvements.(P. 180f lines 4-5). He incurred 
motel and travel expenses, and certainly it cannot be argued 
that these expenses become a part of the cost of the materials 
supplied in the project. They most certainly are then 
lienable. The bill to Dunn Oil for $197.34 was for the hoist. 
This certaily became a part of the building. (P.177, lines 
25-26). There was testimony that some of the Amcor blocks 
went to Richfield and some went to Ogden, but these were 
not included in the final tabulation of amounts owing under 
the lien. The only sum requested for blocks under the lien 
was $171.13. There was no testimony in the record that 
the only blocks used were those salvaged from the North building. 
There was further no testimony whatever that the amount of 
pipe purchased was note totally used on the State Street 
Property. And Don Hall testified that he was looking to 
Jerry Dugger for payment of $2,400.00 for work he performed 
-23-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on the State Street Property. (P. 296, lines 19-21), (P. 296, 
lines 27-28), (P.297, line 19). Hall did not need to give 
Dugger any authority whatever for Dugger to claim this item 
within his lien. Dugger had incurred the Hall charge for 
work which Hall did as a subcontractor at the request of Dugger 
on the State Street Property. As to the house moving, the 
Court apparently believed Duggerfs testimony that the house 
was moved as a part of the improvement of the subject property, 
and awarded judgment accordingly.for $1,200.00. 
It is clear that the court found that all of the items 
which Dugger claimed was due him were in fact lienable items, 
and there was sufficient testimony and evidence in the record 
to substantiate such a finding. The court cannot now overturn 
such a finding, unless it finds the court abused its discretion 
in reaching such a finding with regard to the facts. 
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POINT VIII 
THE COURT DID RULE WITH REGARD TO THE COX COUNTERCLAIM, 
AND THE RULES PROVIDE FOR THE PROPER PROCEDURE TO CURE 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL 
While the Record does not disclose the ruling made 
by the lower court with regard to its ruling on Appellant's 
Counterclaim, the lower court nevertheless did rule on 
the Counterclaim when it heard Appellant's Motion to 
Redeem on July 27, 1976. The Court then ruled that it had 
intended at the time it issued its Memorandum Decision to 
hold that Plaintiff should be awarded judgment for "No 
Cause of Action" on Defendant's Counterclaim. Both Counsel 
for Dugger and Cox were present at the time the Court 
clarified its Memorandum Decision. 
In the instance where the lower court had intended to 
rule with regard to a claim, but failed to specifically reflect 
its ruling on the record, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide for an appropriate remedy without requiring the 
entire Counterclaim to be retried, or remanded for further 
hearing. In Rule 75(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we 
find: 
"...if anything material to either party 
is omitted from the record on appeal by 
error or accident or is misstated therein, 
the parties by stipulation, or the district 
court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted to the Supreme Court, or the 
Supreme Court, on proper suggestion or of its 
own initiative, may direct that the omission 
or misstatement shall be corrected, and if 
necessary that a supplemental record shall 
be certified and transmitted by the clerk..." 
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It would be illogical to think that the lower court 
could have ruled in anv other manner, since Appellantfs 
claim was based upon the theory that Respondent's lien was 
illegal and unjustified, and that the Appellant thereby 
suffered damages. The lower court found, however, that 
Respondent's claim was in fact justified. 
Inasmuch as the lower court has ruled on the Cox 
Counterclaim, but such ruling is not reflected in the 
record on appeal, the Supreme Court should direct that the 
transcript be corrected to reflect the lower court ruling, 
and the Court should direct the clerk of the district court 
to correct the record on appeal accordingly. 
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POINT IX 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED A 
PERSONAL JUDGMENT AND A JUDGMENT ON THE LIEN AT THE SAME 
TIME IS MOOT, AND THUS NOT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL 
On November 10, 1975 the lower court entered its 
araended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgement 
in the above matter, effective, pursuant to court order, 
November 24, 1975, and Respondent immediately had an Order 
of Sale on the South State Street Property issued together 
with a Praecipe to the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, dated 
November 26,1975. Thereafter, the property was listed 
for sale, and the Sheriff's sale took place December 30, 1975, 
wherein the Respondent offered $6,500.00 of his judgment lien 
for the subject property. On or about January 6, 1976 the 
Clerk of Salt Lake County, Utah issued a deficiency judgment 
against the Appellant in the sum of $27,911.28. Said 
deficiency judgment was in the nature of a personal judgment 
against Cox. Thereafter executions on the deficiency judgment 
were issued and transcripts of the judgment were filed in 
various counties in Utah where the Appellant is known to own 
real property. 
The State Street Property has subsequently been redeemed 
by the Appellant by a certificate of redemption issued by 
the Respondent's counsel on August 2, 1976 certifying that 
$6,500.00 of the judgment is deemed satisfied. 
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The question of whether or not there should have 
been only one lien judgment, rather than both a lien judgment 
and a personal judgment is now moot, inasmuch as all that 
now remains is a personal deficiency judgment. Certainly 
the Appellant could not have been harmed by the Personal 
Judgment and the Lien Judgment, since Respondent imraediately 
took steps to levy against the judgment lien and to obtain 
as quickly thereafter a personal judgment for the deficiency 
not satisfied by the sale of the State Street Property. 
Where the Appellant is not prejudiced or harmed by such 
a judgment, error will not be grounds for reversal. Yazoo 
& M. Valley R. Co. v. Mullins, 249 US 531, 63 L ed 754, 39 
S Ct 368. If the prejudicial effect is cured, then the 
court would not reverse such judgment. Weskalnies v. 
Hesterman, 288 111 199, 123 NE 314, 4 ALR 128. 
When a question is presented on appeal which has been 
rendered moot, the reviewing court will generally not 
review the question. Sartin v. Barlow, 196 Miss 159, 16 
So 2nd 372. The appeal was dismissed in this case because 
the court felt the resolution of the question on appeal 
would render no useful purpose since the question had become 
moot or academic. See also Coburn v. Thornton, 30 Ida 347, 
164 P. 1012. Review also 5 Am Jur 2nd, Appeal and Error, 
§913, page 345. 
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And in Hudspeth v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky 606, 265 SW 13, 
the court held that is was the universal rule that the courts 
will not consume their time in deciding abstract propositions 
of law or moot cases and have no jurisdiction to do so. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Respondent Dugger 
respectfully requests that the Court affirm the lower 
court's rulings, that it find the lien on the State 
Street Property to be properly foreclosed, and that it 
affirm the lower court's judgment in all other respects, 
DATED this 26th day of October, 1976. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Respondent - Plaintiff 
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the following Counsel: 
Byron L. Stubbs 
530 East Fifth South 
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Merrill K. Davis 
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240 East 4th South 
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The testimony was that $700.00 of the Maxwell Electric 
lien v/as paid subsequent to the filing of the Dugger lien, 
and the court refused to include within the Dugger lien the 
claim for $6,000.00 in services for superintending the job, 
thus the judgment was rendered by the court in the amount 
of $25,635.44, plus $3,000.00 attorney fees, which is 
actually $1,299.42 less than the above summary amount would 
suggest is due.after discounts. 
The summary shows that the Dugger lien was filed very 
close to the actual amount testified be due at trial. 
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